



**GRAPECA**

*Groupe de Recherche et d'Action pour la paix en Ethiopie  
et dans la Corne de l'Afrique.*

*Research and Action Group for Peace in Ethiopia and the  
Horn of Africa.*

**RAGPEHA**

REPORT ON THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON PEACE IN ETHIOPIA  
15-19 JULY 1991 PARIS - FRANCE  
and  
GRAPECA'S ACTION PLAN FOR 1992

DECEMBER 1991  
PARIS, FRANCE

REPORT ON THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON PEACE IN ETHIOPIA  
15-19 July 1991  
Paris -- France

Presented by GRAPECA

Introduction

Following an agreement reached by the CATHOLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST HUNGER AND FOR DEVELOPMENT (CCFD), the FOUNDATION FOR THE PROGRESS OF MANKIND (FPH) and the RESEARCH AND ACTION GROUP FOR PEACE IN ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA (GRAPECA), a conference on peace and transition in Ethiopia was held from 15 to 19 July 1991 at the headquarters of FPH in Paris.

This conference brought together Ethiopian and foreign intellectuals and experts from various backgrounds. The aim was to help Ethiopian participants work out proposals and recommendations concerning measures that should be implemented to insure peaceful transition and national reconciliation in the country.

In order to put at the disposal of Ethiopian participants the most complete information concerning the experience of transition in other countries, CCFD and FDH mobilized their respective network of experts. Prominent intellectuals and personalities known for their commitment to peace and democracy and who actually participated in the transition process in their respective countries presented papers on the transition to peace and democracy in Algeria, Benin, Cambodia, Chili, Haiti, Laos, Spain, Uganda, Zimbabwe, etc.

For its part GRAPECA invited Ethiopian experts. The invitation list was carefully worked out taking into account the knowledge and experience of participants in a way that would allow for a just representation of political trends, regional and ethnic backgrounds.

While 9 intellectuals were invited from inside Ethiopia, seven were able to participate in the conference. Among those who came from the country, six were from Addis Abeba university: the chairman of the faculty of economics and that of political science, three lecturers at the faculty of political science and one lecturer at the law faculty. Another Ethiopian, who is the representative of CCFD in Ethiopia was also present.

As for those Ethiopian participants who came from abroad, there were members of the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), a member of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), a member of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), two members of the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (ME'ISONE), a journalist working for the Amharic



section of the Voice of America, a lecturer of sociology at the Free University of Berlin, a member of the London based group "Ethiopians against War", a director of a research group on the Horn of Africa (ROME), a lecturer of political science at Amsterdam university and an independent research worker from the Netherlands.

All in all, the ethnic and regional composition of participants was balanced as people from the major nationalities and regions: Amharas, Etythreans, Guarages, Oromos and Tigreans were present at the conference.

Although intellectuals known for being members of political organizations participated at the conference, it was agreed from the outset that nobody was there as the representative of any given organization.

The conference was a considerable success and news of the proceedings was reported to Ethiopia by VOA's correspondent present in Paris. Moreover, a discussion by four participants, members of COEDF, EPRDF, Ethiopians against war and one lecturer at Addis Abeba University, concerning the lessons to be drawn from the Paris gathering was broadcast by the Amharic service of the VOA on 28 July 1991.

Monday, 15 July - Workshop 1

**THEME 1) Political transition after the end of a war or a dictatorship**

Examples presented: Afghanistan, Algeria, Chili, Columbia, Eastern Europe, Haiti, Poland, Spain, Zimbabwe.

**THEME 2) How can an administration be rebuilt?**

Examples presented: Algeria, Chili, Poland, Spain.

Monday, 15 July - Workshop 2

**THEME 3) Immediate measures to regain the peasants' confidence**

Examples presented: Afghanistan, Laos, Nicaragua, Poland.

**THEME 4) Immediate measures to restore the economy**

Examples presented: Poland, Uganda, Third World countries

Wednesday, 17 July - Workshop 1

**THEME 5) Rehabilitation of veterans and refugees**

Examples presented: Algeria, Haiti, Indochina, Zimbabwe.  
And an expose on the situation in Ethiopia

THEME 6) Mobilization of international aid and the role of Non-Governmental Organizations  
Examples presented: Kurdistan, NGOs from the north and humanitarian action in the case of conflict, and a presentation of the situation in Ethiopia.

Wednesday, 17 July - Workshop 2

THEME 7) What symbols for national cohesion?  
Examples presented: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Ukraine. And an expose on the problem in Ethiopia.

THEME 8) The conditions for stability and development in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society  
Examples presented: Algeria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain. And an expose on the situation in Ethiopia.

Friday 19 July - Workshop 1

THEME 9) The development of civil society, instrument of stability and development  
Examples presented: Brazil, Columbia, Haiti, Laos, Poland and the Third World countries.

Friday 19 July - Workshop 2

THEME 10) What constitutional framework is appropriate for societies with several ethnic groups and cultures?  
Examples presented: Benin, Columbia. And an expose on the situation in Ethiopia.

## 2. The plenary sessions reserved for Ethiopian participants

The plenary sessions were intended to allow Ethiopians to exchange views on problems facing Ethiopia's transition to peace and democracy in light of the experiences of other countries.

While the topics selected for the conference were varied in order to allow for discussions covering several aspects of the complex problem of transition, the exchange of views among Ethiopians was clearly dominated by political problems. Everybody was of course aware of the tremendous socio-economic problems facing the country after a long period of war and destruction. It was admitted that if these problems were not solved in due time they could constitute a serious threat to the consolidation of peace.

But even if this was not explicitly stated, everyone seemed to think that the country was going through one of the most crucial periods in its history and that political and psychological mistakes could not only prevent it from solving these problems



but could also drive it to another cycle of violence and destruction with dramatic and tragic consequences.

The general impression at the workshops was that the peace dynamic which followed the events of May 1991 was precisely threatened above all by political behaviour and psychological errors being committed by the new government and, albeit to a lesser extent, by some opposition forces.

This was why the debates were dominated by political issues and the political aspects of transition to peace and democracy, the problems of national reconciliation, the fate of the "vanquished" in the civil war and the question of symbols of national cohesion.

#### A. The plenary session of 16 July

The session started by a discussion of the proceedings of the workshops on the previous day and the experiences of transition presented by foreign friends. It was then decided to proceed to a discussion of the situation in Ethiopia.

The discussion held in a spirit of open-mindedness, helped to identify some of the major problems threatening the unfolding peace dynamics even if everyone did not agree when it came to proposing solutions.

##### a) the problem of nationalities

Everyone agreed that there was a problem of nationalities in Ethiopia and that it was a very serious one. But while the EPRDF member present at the conference contended that the provisional government was trying to work out a just and democratic solution to the problem, most participants - believing that the nationality question in Ethiopia was too serious a problem to be manipulated for political ends - deplored its being abused by the government for 'tactical' reasons.

Several participants thought that the systematic call made by the government for people to organize on an exclusively ethnic basis betrayed deliberate political manoeuvring intended to draw political advantages from unduly exaggerated antagonisms among the country's different ethnic groups. This attitude, it was asserted, "could lead the peoples of Ethiopia to fratricide wars with disastrous consequences".

It was the opinion of most participants that the exacerbation of the problem could lead to "ethnic hatred" which many said would be a new phenomenon in the history of inter-ethnic relations in Ethiopia. In fact, in spite of decades of armed conflicts between successive governments and nationalist fronts, Ethiopia did not experience pogroms or mass killings of members of one ethnic group per se by people from other ethnic groups. The situation in



Ethiopia has been a far cry from what happened (or is happening) in some other African countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, etc.

Naturally, everyone had wondered if and how long such "popular wisdom" would hold in the face of deliberate attempts of politicians to use this delicate and complex question in the struggle for power. It was in this context that the question of the role of intellectuals and that of their possible contribution towards the solution of the problem was raised by most participants. The diagnosis was clear: Almost everyone admitted that the root of the problem was the incapacity of the country's intellectuals and politicians from all ethnic groups to define a modus vivendi and to work out rules of "peaceful coexistence" among themselves.

Given the situation in today's Ethiopia an in-depth discussion among the country's intellectuals in view of working out this democratic modus vivendi is not only necessary but is also a matter of utmost urgency. This, however, is a necessary but not sufficient step. If and when established, the harmonious and democratic relationships among the country's elites must be translated into democratic relationships among the masses of the Ethiopian people within the framework of a constitution which should take into account the multiethnic and pluricultural character of Ethiopian society. It was suggested by one participant that priority be given to "the establishment of positive interaction among the three main nationalities (AMHARAS, OROMOS and TIGREANS who constitute more than 80% of the population) as a step towards encouraging other ethnic groups to follow suit."

#### b) The Eritrean question

Some serious differences came to the surface right from the beginning on the question of the right to self-determination of nationalities in general and that of the peoples in Eritrea in particular. This is a long-standing issue of contention among Ethiopians: those who support the idea of unity based on equality without resorting to the exercise of the right to self-determination on the one hand, and on the other, those who stand for the exercise of this right "up to and including cessation" as a guarantee of unity based not only on equality but also on the concept of "voluntary union". The latter accept the idea of a referendum of self-determination in order to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully and democratically.

That having been said, even supporters of the idea of a referendum in Eritrea seemed clearly antagonized by what was unfolding in Eritrea since the EPLF takeover of the region in the last days of May 1991.



Generally, what most participants deplored was a "double fait accompli".

First in Ethiopia, the provisional government, led by EPRDF, a long-standing ally of EPLF, has endorsed the idea of a referendum in Eritrea without first conducting wide ranging consultation among the peoples of the country and after having arbitrarily excluded some Ethiopian democratic forces and organizations in Eritrea opposed to EPLF from attending the "National conference" which approved the government's proposal.

There was also a "fait accompli" in Eritrea where the provisional government established there by EPLF is actively preparing a "referendum" while at the same time severely curbing the democratic rights of the people and expelling en masse so-called "Ethiopians" or even those of Eritrean origin hostile to EPLF and accused of having collaborated with the ousted Mengistu regime.

In spite of these attempts by the two fronts, the Eritrean problem seems far from being solved. The participants have clearly identified two possible sources of future conflicts with respect to the Eritrean question:

Already Ethiopian opposition forces - supported by large sectors of society - have made it clear that the result of a referendum organized and conducted under such conditions would not be binding.

Secondly, there is the AFAR question. The problem was already there as war between EPLF and AFAR nationalist forces was already raging even while the Paris conference was taking place. The AFARS, whose territory extends over 800 km along the Red Sea coast, reject any idea of being divided into two separate countries (Ethiopia and the future independent Eritrean state) and want to exercise their right to self-determination by voting separately.

Despite their diverging views on the question of a referendum in Eritrea, all participants were convinced that the only way to avoid other tragic armed conflicts was to restore full democratic rights both in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

c) The "vanquished" of the civil war and the question of peace

The fate of 300,000 soldiers and officers of the vanquished army - a question considered by many as very crucial for the democratic process and for national reconciliation - seems to be a point of serious discord among the participants.

Everyone agrees on the facts: with the defeat of the army of the former regime, thousands of soldiers and officers have been summarily executed in Eritrea. Others have escaped to neighbouring Sudan. Still others fled to Djibouti and Kenya. In Ethiopia itself,



more than 200,000 former soldiers and officers are held captive in camps. The army and security establishments have been dissolved. The families of these people have been rendered destitute.

While everybody recognized the gravity of the human tragedy taking place, the debate centered on the political aspects of the problem.

There were first those whom we may call "integrationists". Quoting the case of countries which managed a more or less smooth and successful transition to peace and democracy and specially that of Spain, where according to Mr. Planes "Not a single policeman has been dismissed from his job during the transition period", these participants claimed that at least some of the members of the vanquished army should be incorporated into a national defence force which, in any case, should be depoliticized. Two main reasons were forwarded to support this policy.

First we have political reasons: the establishment of pluralism could not be seriously envisaged while the country's army is strongly politicized and under the ideological and political control of one organization. This is all the more difficult while 80% of the soldiers, officers and "political commissars" of the Front are from the Tigray ethnic group which constitutes only about 8% of the entire population of Ethiopia.

In the second place, it is argued that some degree of integration would be in the interest of national cohesion and reconciliation. The policy of the "victors" against the "vanquished" which has been systematically avoided by all successful transitions, is being applied in Ethiopia. It has a negative effect on the lives of millions of citizens. One section of society is at loggerheads with the other. This may lead the "vanquished" to adopt an attitude of "hatred which will in turn breed serious acts of destabilization of the peace process".

Those who are opposed to this policy argue that "the demise of the DERG's army should be approved as this army was the instrument used to perpetuate sectarian hegemony in general and Amhara domination in particular."

They support the policy of dismantling and neutralization of the army of the ousted regime. To support this position they also forward political reasons: re-arming these soldiers and officers whose military, political and ideological training had been acquired under a chauvinistic and totalitarian regime will constitute a serious threat to democracy, to pluralism and to peace.

With regard to the question of national cohesion, they argue that a policy of national reconciliation (involving these people) could be conducted without necessarily resorting to integration. What is important, according to them is avoiding a systematic policy of



revenge against all those who served the former regime and seeing to it that once released, these people be assisted so that in the long run they can support themselves.

In spite of these fundamental differences, all participants were of the opinion that such a policy of rehabilitation must be part and parcel of a global strategy of peace and national reconciliation in Ethiopia.

d) The question of human and democratic rights

While deploring the exclusion of some Ethiopian and Eritrean organizations opposed to EPRDF and EPLF from attending the national conference held in Addis Abeba on 1 July 1991, the majority of the participants considered that the adoption by the conference of a "Human Rights charter" was a positive development and could contribute to the establishment of democracy in the country.

Some participants argued that the attitude of the two governments in Addis Abeba and Asmara contradict and infringe the rights and liberties recognized in this charter. Others, while acknowledging the existence of such negative developments, considered that these governments should be given "the benefit of the doubt" while at the same time pressure should be applied to guarantee full respect of these rights as embodied in the charter.

Following discussions on "political conditions for the establishment of peace and national reconciliation" the participants identified the following measures as indispensable for the implementation of these objectives:

1. Legalization of all political parties and other forms of association with firm guarantees for the right to life, safety and security of their members
2. The establishment of an independent judiciary system
3. The establishment of independent mass media
4. The establishment of a secular and democratic state which ensures equality of all citizens before the law, a fair and equitable access to resources with a sufficient degree of devolution of political and economic power that would ensure grassroot democratic participation
5. The prevention of party dominance and interference in governmental-administrative and academic institutions
6. The detachment of the armed forces from party politics
7. The establishment of an independent election commission
8. A constitutional guarantee of free and fair elections

B. The plenary sessions of 18 and 19 July

The sessions started with a brief discussion of proceedings of the workshops of 17 July, which dealt with the problems of rehabilitation of veterans and refugees, mobilization of

international assistance and the role of NGOs, the problem of symbols of national cohesion and finally the conditions for stability and development in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society.

#### 1. The problem of rehabilitation of veterans and refugees

Given the fact that this problem and that of international assistance are closely related, the two themes were treated together.

The exposes presented by intellectuals from Addis Abeba clearly indicated that the problem was serious and extremely complex. The number of people negatively affected by political events in the country since EPRDF's takeover and who therefore need assistance is considerable.

There are of course demobilized soldiers and officers who together with their families number at least half a million people. There are also the evacuees from Eritrea who are at least 200,000 leaving aside the members of the armed forces who are accounted for with the other demobilized troops. To this must be added tens of thousands of people (mainly peasants) who had fled their villages during the armed conflicts which were particularly deadly during the last months of the Mengistu regime.

As for refugees, they are estimated at more than a million - the participants tried to distinguish three more or less distinct groups as suggested by friends who came from inside the country:

First we have war refugees. The majority are peasants. Relative peace could incite them to return "en masse". They need a quick solution to their problem of survival and rehabilitation. If a solution does not come rapidly, they may be tempted to play into the hands of all sorts of opposition forces and thus could threaten the peace process.

Then we have political refugees, who include tens of thousands of people who fled the country in the aftermath of EPRDF's seizure of power in Addis Abeba. All participants were of the opinion that these people would not return to their country before the establishment of a democratic government and the implementation of a policy of national reconciliation. Return to the country by the third group - that of economic refugees - is even more improbable at least in the foreseeable future.

The problem of refugees is therefore above all a peasant problem.

The policy towards veterans and refugees must therefore address two concrete issues: First ensuring survival and then embarking on programmes of rehabilitation of at least two million people. When



we add to this about 5 million victims of famine, it is clear that the task facing the country is enormous and complex.

The discussions concerning possible solutions to this serious problem highlighted the discrepancy between the resources at the disposal of Ethiopia which is one of the poorest even among the LDC group and which is emerging from devastating and long drawn-out armed conflicts and the immediate and long-term needs of a vast portion of its population.

Given this unfavourable context and the volatile political situation in the country, the participants considered that the problem could not be solved unless three major obstacles are overcome:

1. There should be peace and stability in the country; referring to past experience, some tried to highlight the dangers of a possible 'vicious circle': Rehabilitation could hardly be envisaged without peace and stability. But if this problem of survival and rehabilitation is not resolved as a matter of urgency, the hundreds of thousands of destabilized people could constitute a serious threat to peace by joining armed opposition groups.
2. The international community must mobilize to help the country: First of all, this mobilization must be in support of peace, which cannot be achieved without democracy and a coherent policy of national reconciliation. The second aspect of this mobilization should aim at a massive increase of relief and development assistance without which the country will be unable to respond to the immediate needs of its people.
3. The establishment of genuine dialogue among Ethiopia's political forces to see to it that the rehabilitation effort (and the mechanisms of distribution of international assistance) transcends ethnic rivalries. In fact, many participants expressed fear that if the present tendency towards "ethnocentrism" develops unchecked, each group may be tempted to use its political influence to unduly favour its own ethnic base and that such practices may lead to a further exacerbation of interethnic relations.

b) The question of symbols and national cohesion

This was the first time that this problem, which is crucial for Ethiopia's future, was seriously discussed at a gathering of the country's intellectuals. Once the debate started, everyone sensed that the problem was extremely complex and that positions of participants were to say the least contradictory.

The awareness of the importance of symbols as factors fostering national cohesion was practically the only point of agreement among



the participants. The three more or less distinct positions which emerged from the debate in the conference and informal discussions can be summarized as follows:

i) First we have those who deny the existence of any positive common heritage which can serve as a symbol for national cohesion in Ethiopia. They hold that cohesion among the peoples of Ethiopia could only be developed on the will to build a common future. They argue that all the traditional symbols of "unity", ie the monarchy, the Orthodox church, etc., could not serve as factors of cohesion for two main reasons:

All the peoples of Ethiopia do not accept these symbols as their own because these so-called "historical symbols of Ethiopia" are in fact those of the Amharas and Tigreans of the former Abyssinia.

In the second place, these symbols revive memories of a period of oppression and humiliation that other ethnic groups suffered at the hands of Abyssinians and specially the Amharas who had dominated the country for so long.

While insisting on the dangers to national cohesion that may result from a return to these symbols and indeed from any other attempts to build national unity based on reference to history, they call for a "new start" based not "on the glory of the past but the misery of today". And of course on the common will of the peoples to live and work together to overcome this misery.

They stand for the unity of the country based on this will to construct a common and better future and believe that the country's intellectuals must do everything they can to relay this message to the people. If this attempt is to succeed, it must be accompanied by efforts to establish a democratic state where the peoples of Ethiopia will gradually learn to live harmoniously in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

ii) Those who are opposed to this thesis do not deny the importance of the idea of "common destiny" as a factor of cohesion. But they consider that national cohesion could not be built only on "present misery and the hope of a bright future". This is all the more true in that this approach is based on the illusion that one can easily disregard the past on the pretext that there is nothing positive in the common heritage.

Such an attempt to negate the past in order to build the future would be to say the least a very risky endeavour. National cohesion built on such a fragile basis will always be at the mercy of agitators and politicians who will always attempt to revive past wrongs in order to advance their petty political and personal aims.

Therefore, this second group considers that reference to history is indispensable. They believe that Ethiopia's intellectuals must



conduct serious research concerning the country's history and the complex interactions among its peoples. They are of the opinion that this common effort will:

- contribute to the formation of a more balanced view of the negative aspects of the common heritage. They recognize that some ethnic groups have suffered more than others but they contend that the fate of all peoples of Ethiopia - be it under the feudal tyranny of Emperor Haile Selassie or the totalitarian rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam - had more or less been the same. Therefore no ethnic group could pretend to have the "monopoly of suffering" as would suggest a superficial understanding of the country's history.
- Help identify some positive elements in this common heritage. The peoples of Ethiopia have a common historical heritage of resistance to colonialism. This positive heritage could not be appropriated by one single nationality. The same can be said of the struggle against feudalism or the Mengistu dictatorship. This was not a struggle of oppressed nationalities alone, but also that of Amhara democrats. This struggle has its martyrs from all nationalities and these martyrs are as many positive factors in the common heritage.
- Help reach - if not the same conclusion - at least a less conflictual understanding of Ethiopia's past and the complex interaction among its peoples. Such a clarification, they believe, would be a considerable step forward as it would make it possible for intellectuals to speak with the same voice in their efforts to mobilize the people.

iii) The third group considers that given the political context and the imminent dangers facing the country, absolute priority must be given to urgently solving the present crisis. Debates concerning the past and the future - although necessary - are secondary compared to the common struggle which should be waged to ensure democracy and the right to self-determination of nationalities in Ethiopia.

Before dealing with the questions of common heritage and common future, the country's intellectuals must first work out a democratic modus vivendi which will govern their relationships and struggle together for equality.

Before any talk of "common symbols" one must clearly recognize the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of Ethiopian society and see to it that every nationality asserts its own identity by resorting if need be to its own symbols.

They are of the opinion that only the success of such an approach and the setting up of democratic and brotherly relationships will help the peoples of the country look upon their common (and

conflicting) heritage with some degree of serenity and envisage the future with hope. Such an approach would in fact help dissipate misgivings inherited from the past and better allocate the burdens of the tremendous efforts and sacrifices that would be needed to reconstruct the country.



## **ANNEX I: List of resource persons and subjects treated in the workshops**

### **I. Political transition after the end of a war or a dictatorship**

1. Mr. PLANES, Jordi, from the Centre for International Historical Studies (CEHI), Barcelona, Spain: the Spanish experience
2. Mr. BEYLIN, Marek, Historian and journalist: the fall of the communist regime in Poland.
3. Mr. DREANO Bernard from the European citizens Assembly: similarities and differences of transitions in Eastern Europe.
4. M. MIARA, Luis, vice-president of the Socialist Party of Chili and head of the centre for the analysis and transformation of national reality (CENAT): the democratic transition in Chili.
5. Mr. RESTREPO Luis-Alberto from the CINEP, Bogota, Columbia: The struggle against structural violence in Columbia.
6. Mr VERRON, Michel, from the MADERA Association: The difficult end of the war in Afghanistan.
7. Mr. DJEGHLOUL, Abdelkader, Algerian sociologist: The two Algerian transitions
8. Mr HENRYS, Jean-Hugues, Interchurch Council: Fall of the dictatorship and democratic transition in Haiti.
9. Miss TODD, Judith from the "ZIMBABWE PROJECT": the case of Zimbabwe.

### **II. How can an administration be rebuilt?**

1. Mr. PLANES, Jordi: Setting decentralization: the case of Spain
2. Mr. MIARA, Luis: The decentralization process of regionalization and democratization in Chili
3. Mr. KRASNOWOLSKI, Andre: Professor, Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. The new elected authorities and the previous administration: the case of Poland.
4. Mr. BOUHRAOUA, Attache at the Medial and social Service for Immigrants, Vitry (France). Birth of a national administration: the case of Algeria.

### **III. Immediate measures to regain the peasants' confidence**

1. Mr. MERMET, Michel from IRAM, Paris: The experience of Nicaragua
2. Mr. DABROWSKI, Pioth Ul Potocka, Warsaw (Poland): The new agricultural policy in Poland.
3. Mr. VANGKESAY Senedao, S.P.R.J. Association in Laos. Successful experience of the reinsertion of peasants displaced by war in Laos.

### **IV. Immediate measures to restore the economy**

1. Mrs. NOWAK, Maria, President of the Association for Development and Economic Initiative (ADIE) Paris, France: The case of Poland
2. Mr. KABERUKA, Will, Economic advisor to the President of Uganda:

## The reconstruction of Uganda after the war

### V. Rehabilitation of veterans and refugees

1. Mr. Richard PETRIS, the friends of a school for peace, Grenoble, France: the Case of the countries of Indochina
2. M. BOUHRAOUA Taeb: the Problem of refugees and veterans in Algeria
3. Mr. SIBB Bernard, Psychiatrist, CMPP: The psychological problems of Algerian veterans
4. Mr. GUDINA, Merera, Department of political sciences, University of Addis Abeba, Ethiopia: The problem of reinsertion of veterans in Ethiopia
5. Miss TODD, Judith, Zimbabwe Project (Bulawayo Zimbabwe): The experience of Zimbabwe
6. Mr. KANDRICH, Mohamed, Professor at the University of Algiers, President of TOUIZA, Algiers: A few aspects of the situation in Algeria
7. Mr. HENRYS, Jean-Hugues: Reinsertion of the "repatriated" in Haiti

### VI. Mobilization of international aid and the role of Non-Governmental Organizations

1. Mr. NEZAL, Kendal, President of the Kurd Institute of Paris: The Kurd problem and the issue antitarian action
2. Mr. LECHERVY, Christian, researcher at the Institute of international and strategic relations (IRIS), Universite de Paris Nord: The problem of aid and cooperation in a democratic transition process.
3. Mr. MENGISTE Taye: Chairman of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Addis Abeba, Ethiopia: The problem of mobilization of international aid in Ethiopia.

### VII. What symbols for national cohesion?

1. Mr. JECQUIER, Nicolas, Professor, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Culture and language, symbols of national cohesion in Ukraine
2. Mr. LINDT, August, former ambassador, former high commissioner for refugees: the Difficult equilibrium of peace in Nigeria.
3. Mr. ALEMAYEHU, Derege, sociologist, Universite Libre de Berlin: Ethiopia in search of a symbol of national cohesion
4. Mr. NARANG Nouth, CEDORECK: Regenerating Cambodian society by linking the past to the future
5. Mr. RESTROPO Luis-Alberto: Reconstruction of national cohesion in Columbia
6. Mr. PLANES, Jordi: The Constitution, symbol of political cohesion, the case of Spain
7. Mr. JACQUIER, Nicolas, Professor: University of Lausanne (Switzerland): the case of Afghanistan
8. Mr. LANGE, Christof: CESKOBRATSKRA CIRKEV EVANGELICKA, Prague



(Czechoslovakia), The case of Czechoslovakia

**VIII The conditions for stability and development in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society**

1. Mr. KHANDRICH, Mohamed: The rebirth of associative life in Algeria
2. Mr. TERFA, Solomon, Chairman of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Addis Abeba, Ethiopia
3. Mr. PLANES, Jordi: A "nation of nations": the case of Spain
4. Mr. LANGE, Christof: CESKOBRATSKRA CIRKEV EVANGELICKA, Prague (Czechoslovakia): Generation gaps and the economic problem in Czechoslovakia
5. Mrs. VERLAETEN Marie-Paule, D.I.A.L. Paris (France): Cohabitation of three communities in Belgium

**IX. The development of civil society, instrument of stability and development**

1. Mrs. de CHAPONAY Henryane C E D A L (Paris, France). The case of Brazil
2. Mr. RESTREPO Luis-Alberto: The relationship between civil society, the State and political parties in Columbia
3. Mr. HENRYS, Jean-Hugues: The end of dictatorship and development of the civil society: the case of Haiti
4. Mr. BERHANU, Kassahun, Faculty of political sciences, University of Addis Abeba (Ethiopia): The NGO and their role in the democratization of the civil society
5. Mr. SENEDAO Venagkedsay: Civil society and political power in Laos
6. Mr. KRASNOWOLSKI, Andre: One party, one opposition movement and construction of civil society: the Polish experience

**X. What constitutional framework is appropriate for societies with several ethnic groups and cultures?**

1. Mr. NZA MUJO Goddy, SONGHAI Project, Porto Novo (Benin): How to build a nation: the case of Benin
2. Mr. HAILU Zecharias, Faculty of law, University of Addis Abeba (Ethiopia) for the establishment of a federal system: the case of Ethiopia
3. Mr. RESTREPO, Luis-Alberto: The determinant role of a constituent assembly: the case of Columbia